



THE INKERMAN GROUP



Papering Over The Cracks of a Yemeni Crisis?

An analysis of the economic, political and security challenges facing the Sana'a Government

Executive Summary

- Yemen faces several challenges at present which increase the risk of causing the country to become a failed state. These include a growing economic crisis forced by declining oil reserves and the global recession, the strain on political stability posed by the impending transition of power, antipathy towards President Saleh after cancelled elections and multiple internal threats to security.
- Fifteen years after unification Yemen remains an incomplete state of disparate tribes and religious affiliations most of which are now quite distinct from the government control of Sana'a.
- Al Qaeda's resurgence in Yemen is yet to have been effectively counteracted and may now be at the strongest it has ever been thanks to the influx of jihadist from Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and the Horn of Africa.
- The growing trend in kidnap and terrorist activity in Yemen persists and if it escalates any further it has the potential to expand a lawless zone.
- With the gradual economic diversification from oil to LNG exports and the continued support of the US under the new Obama Administration, as well as its powerful gulf neighbours such as Saudi Arabia, it is possible that Yemen can recover and turn the tide.
- Uncertainty over Yemen's future prevents sustained integrated investment on a scale that would salvage the economy.

'Man maat al-yaum salim min dhanb bukra' - (Who dies today is safe from tomorrow's sin)
- Old Yemeni proverb

Despite fifteen years of relative stability in Yemen, the convergence of economic, political and security challenges are arguably testing the Government's capacity to rule effectively. This carries grave risks for not only Yemen's political, sectarian and social equilibrium but that of potential destabilisation of the wider Middle-East. Since the Spring of 2009, Yemen has continued its deterioration into a strategic jihadist hub for Islamic insurgents calling themselves al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, with terrorist and kidnapping activity markedly rising. However, Sana'a has often linked this to tribal incidents rather than a violent insurgency in key operating areas of the country such as the South. The violence comes at a critical time for the country, affected as it is by the marked drop in oil prices deeply cutting into revenue streams and a growing democratic movement which has the potential to lead to regional instability among Yemen's wealthier Arab neighbours. This Inkerman Monitor will seek to address the current security situation in the country, reasons for the perceived instability and the jihadist attraction, whilst analysing the policies being pursued by Sana'a and the implications this has for organisations operating in the region.

Overview

The merger of the formerly separate states of North Yemen and South Yemen created the Republic of Yemen in 1990. In 1994 government forces loyal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh quashed an attempt by southern-based dissidents to secede from the newly unified state however, to this day many Southern Yemenis still resent what they perceive as continued northern political economic and cultural domination of daily life. In addition to North-South cleavages based on religious sectarian differences, political rivalries, and disputes over sharing of oil revenue, Yemen faces complex regional issues that have created additional divisions within the population and further complicated efforts by the government to build a unified, modern state.

President Saleh, a former military officer, has governed Yemen since the unified state came into being in 1990; prior to this, he had headed the former state of North Yemen from 1978 to 1990. In Yemen's first popular presidential election held in 1999, President Saleh won 96.3% of the vote amidst cries of ballot tampering. In 2006 Saleh stood for re-election and received 77% of the vote. Throughout his decades of rule, President Saleh has balanced various political forces (tribes, political parties, military officials, and

radical Islamists) to create a stable ruling coalition that has kept his regime intact. However in recent years a series of events, including increased Al Qaeda attacks, an insurgency in the North and civil unrest in the south, have led some experts to conclude that Yemen may be on the verge of collapse, particularly given its already precarious economic condition. This could in turn negatively affect global energy security, due to Yemen's location astride the Bab al Mandab strait between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and due to its strategically important location to the Gulf Arab States, notably Saudi Arabia.

Yemen faces an array of daunting development challenges that some observers believe make it at risk of becoming a failed state in the next few decades. Yemen remains the poorest nation in the Arab world burdened with a 27% inflation rate and over 40% of the population of twenty-two million citizens unemployed. Almost half of that population lives below the poverty line, and per capita GDP is estimated to be only US\$700 meaning the country is heavily dependent on food imports from Gulf countries, Western donors, and international financial institutions, making it especially vulnerable to global food price shocks. It is argued that the combination of Yemen's rapidly rising population, dwindling resources and the

prospect of continued restrictions on legitimate electoral representation by the government is now more than ever creating a perfect breeding ground for terrorists intent on creating a hub from which to train and target infrastructure and western business to restrict investment and hamper development in the state

The Saleh Effect - A political view of Yemen

Yemen has a long history of violent revolutions, tribal rebellions, political assassinations, outbursts of rioting, and other frequent social and political turbulence. However, the current incumbent, President Saleh, has been credited with the ability to survive more than three decades in office. Since 1993 'Ali 'Abdullah Saleh has overseen five national elections as head of the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) Party. This includes three parliamentary elections and two presidential elections in which he was elected President by an overwhelming majority. Although Saleh prides himself on making Yemen the Arabian Peninsula's first democracy, it stands at a critical juncture at present. Yemen's centralised democratic structures outstrip the political maturity of its rural, barely literate, society. Modern, Western-style government institutions are distorted by the influence of President Saleh's northern tribal power base and a closely woven informal patronage network. The development of the state is incomplete. President Saleh will be seventy at the time of the next election in 2013, and will also have been in power for thirty-five years, when his country is expected to attempt a peaceful transition of power. Despite rumours of the presidency being handed down to his son Ahmed, no clear successor has yet to emerge.

Previously, Saleh's divide-and-rule strategy enabled him to govern by proxy through rival sheikhs but his reputation as a master of crisis management maybe showing signs of slipping. In the last eighteen months, an erratic stop-go civil war in the northern province of Sa'dah, a sympathetic rebel uprising on the fringes of the capital, riots throughout the South, two

fatal attacks on Western tourists and an attack utilising twin car bombs on the US Embassy, have fuelled fears that the government is losing its grip on the country.

The Elections that should have been – April 2009 Parliamentary Elections

From a political angle this growing crisis can be seen through the abrupt cancellation of the scheduled April 2009 parliamentary elections which were set to be an important barometer for assessing Saleh's ability to balance competing forces in Yemen's complicated but pluralistic political structure. The announcement came as a surprise to the international community, considering Saleh's previous style of monopolistic political control. Saleh's official reason given for the decision was that he faced an electoral boycott by a coalition of five weaker opposition parties known as the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). This does not quite add up though as the JMP, despite its larger variety of constituent members: the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), which ruled the former South Yemen, the conservative Islamist party *Islah* (or "Reform"), and various Nasserite and Ba'thist parties are minimal to the voter turnout and support base.

It is possible that Saleh conceded to opposition pressure because the opposition now includes conservative Islamist elements. If so, there may be shadows of doubt about the popular legitimacy of the President and his ruling party. One alternative view is that President Saleh's recent concession, in response to the threat of an opposition boycott, relates to a series of regional uprisings in the country. The first, since 2004, is centred in Sa'da province along the north-western border with Saudi Arabia. The second, starting separately in 2007, spread across the southern and eastern provinces where the YSP ruled an independent state prior to unification in 1990. The recent postponement of Yemen's parliamentary election may say more about the growing appearance of cracks in the country's territorial integrity. Could President Saleh

have agreed to delay the fourth parliamentary election because of fundamental fears about Yemeni national unity and the basic survival of the state in its present form? The five year uprising in Sa'da province has been the more violent and deadly of the two uprisings, both in terms of civilian deaths and injuries and casualties among Yemeni soldiers and security forces. However, as will be explained later in this paper, Sa'da has been less of a concern for President Saleh than the uprising in the southern and eastern provinces. It is possible that, as a constitutional amendment is currently under review to limit the presidency to two terms of five years, Saleh has used dealing with this uprising as a stalling tactic to allow him to stay in power for longer.

The increasing kidnap risk

Yemen is mostly an undeveloped country where, outside of the capital of Sana'a, tribal leaders often exert more control than central and local government authorities. It has long been the scene of random violence and kidnapping; there are an estimated sixty million firearms among a population of less than twenty million. Kidnappings of Yemeni officials and foreign tourists have been carried out mainly by dissatisfied tribal groups pressing the government for financial largesse or for infrastructure projects in their districts and an increasing trend in this sort of action means that Yemen continues to pose a significant risk of kidnap to both natives and foreigners alike.

In July 2009, Yemen gained the top spot from Iraq for incidents of kidnap and ransom in the Middle East mainly due to the sharp increase in foreign hostage taking place since the turn of the year. In January 2009 a German engineer was kidnapped by southern tribesmen, who demanded the release of a fellow tribesman who was jailed for murder in 1989. His whereabouts remain unknown. However, in February 2009, the government began to increasingly link these kidnaps with militants allied to al Qaeda. In March 2009, although independent security experts claimed that most acts committed were by

tribesmen to use as leverage against the government, Sana'a continued to blame the kidnapping of four German archaeologists in the Serwah area on al Qaeda. Two further Dutch tourists were kidnapped in April 2009 by armed members of the Bani Dhabyan tribe in Sana'a, however that incident was thought to be by a clan asking for a ransom or making other demands such as pressurising the government to provide better services and improve living conditions and did not result in the harming of the victims.

Although worrying, these attacks are not likely to add to the security concerns of foreign firms developing the oil and gas sector but they will of course damage Yemen's nascent tourism sector. This has perhaps been affected by the violent nature of the kidnapping of nine foreigners, including seven Germans, a Briton and a South Korean, in Yemen's Northern Sa'ada province on 14 June 2009 which resulted in three dismembered bodies being found a week later. As no group has yet to claim responsibility for the action, speculation remains as to the identity of the captors as well as the level of political manipulation of the issue by both the state and rebels. This case, however, appears to be different not only because of the murders, but because it has taken place in Sa'ada, a front line for political and tribal conflict and a haven for drugs traffickers and gun runners. Several commentators have discounted the involvement of an al Qaeda-linked group because all three hostages were women and al Qaeda reputedly rarely kills female hostages; the al Qaeda presence in the mountainous region dominated by the Shiite al Houthi rebels is not considered to be strong enough to carry out such an operation, nor would they have the ability to escape and hide freely without being spotted by security forces or the Shiite guerrillas. Nonetheless, the ostensible objective of the hostage-taking, terrorising foreigners into leaving the country, fits with al Qaeda's philosophy and could represent the beginning of a new al Qaeda tactic in Yemen. It is possible that al Qaeda could have targeted the nine for working for a Dutch Christian relief group and hospital

whose members have recently been accused by locals of proselytising and conducting covert missionary work, an easy justification for Salafist violence.

The creation of an Al Qaeda hub?

In March 2008 al Qaeda posted a message calling on its members to relocate to Yemen to start a jihad against the government and western interests in the country. Recent intelligence reports also suggest that al Qaeda fighters are leaving Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, where the group has suffered serious setbacks. In August 2009 Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi claimed Yemen is currently playing host to more than 1,000 jihadi fighters and al Qaeda affiliates which has renewed international concerns that Yemen is re-emerging as a major terrorist safe haven.

The establishment of a Jihadi cell in Yemen originates from a 'security arrangement' the islamists are believed to have struck with the government and security services after 2001 and their exit from Afghanistan, something based on the proviso of good behaviour within Yemen's borders. That deal held for several years before and after the 2000 attack on the USS Cole while it was refuelling in Aden harbour (resulting in the deaths of seventeen sailors) and the maritime bombing of a French oil tanker in 2002. Between 2002 and 2004, the Yemeni Government, with the assistance of the US, was able to severely disrupt al Qaeda-inspired terrorist activity in Yemen. However, in recent years, analysts observe that a new generation of militants has emerged with experience of fighting coalition forces in Iraq and are more inclined to target the Yemeni Government itself, in addition to foreign and Western interests in Yemen.

The first signs of an increase in Jihadi violence in Yemen was after a February 2006 jailbreak, when twenty-three terrorists escaped from a high-security prison. On 15 September 2006, only days before Yemen's presidential election, Yemeni security forces foiled two near simultaneous al Qaeda suicide attacks on

oil facilities in the north-eastern region of Maarib and on the Gulf of Aden coast at Dhabba. Had it succeeded, the attack would have crippled Yemen's oil industry.

The first attempted use of twin car bombs followed in September 2007, in thwarted attacks on two separate oil installations. Since the summer of 2007, the rate of terrorist activity has steadily increased, with eight Spanish tourists killed in a suicide bomb in July 2007, two Belgians shot in an ambush on a tourist convoy in January 2008 and a low-level bombing campaign against Western targets in Sana'a during the spring of 2008. On 10 April 2008 an explosion occurred at the headquarters of the Canadian oil company Nexum Petroleum and a week later an al Qaeda affiliate, the Yemen Soldiers Brigades, claimed responsibility. The attack involving twin car bombs outside the US Embassy on 17 September 2008 perhaps confirmed fears of a resurgent terrorist movement, as eighteen people died when six suicide bombers in two vehicles breached the outer perimeter of the security cordon, having detonated their explosives at the main gate to the compound. Al Qaeda in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attack and, in its message, the group noted that the attack did not take place in Muslim markets or other gathering places, but rather "in the den of cunning and deception, the security quarters of the global Crusade." Such an incursion into a heavily defended compound shows the growing sophistication, dedication and lethal intent of the Islamist terrorist groups in Yemen, whilst also showing their capability to successfully plan and execute a strike against a high value target, such as an oil installation or foreign government compound.

President Saleh continues to be under pressure from both the US and Saudi Arabia to contain and crack down on the Islamist militant threat in his country. Moreover, after spending considerable resources breaking up al Qaeda's presence in Saudi Arabia, the Saudis have an interest in preventing the group from reforming on its border. Given that Saudi Arabia has pledged US\$1 billion in

development aid to Yemen, Saleh is equally interested in keeping his Northern neighbour happy.

While external forces have put pressure on Saleh, internal politics within Yemen are much more influential. Yemen's intelligence community is primarily made up of Salafists and jihadists, making it very difficult for Saleh to challenge Islamist militant groups. Compounding the problem is the fact that much of Yemen, outside of major urban centres such as Sana'a or Aden, is controlled by tribal factions and religious leaders, where the central government holds little sway. Even if Saleh had the political support to pursue militant groups, security forces would face resistance in the tribal areas of Hadramout, where al Qaeda is provided refuge by tribal leaders.

Instability from within:

The North

Over the past several years, a group of Zaydi Shiites in the remote Northern Yemeni province of Sa'da have waged a guerrilla war against the Yemeni Government. The revolt has been spearheaded by members of the Al Houthi family, a prominent Zaydi religious group who dispute the legitimacy of the Yemeni Government and are firmly opposed to the rule of President Saleh. Sa'da remains one of the poorest areas of Yemen, and experts believe the Al Houthi family seized upon the desperation of many of the province's inhabitants to build a religiously inspired insurgent movement capable of fighting guerrilla warfare in the region's mountainous areas. This was exemplified by a statement in June 2009 by the new leader of the group, Abdul Malik al Houthi, who stated the Yemeni Government was "an ally of Americans and Jews."

In the main, the international community has yet to recognise the Sa'da conflict's destabilising potential or pressured the government to shift course, perhaps due to the single-minded focus on Yemen's struggle

with al Qaeda. Although the war against the Al Houthi rebels remains a localised conflict, 2009 continues to see recurrent localised fighting. Most Yemen experts believe that the longer the violence festers, the politically weaker it makes Saleh appear, particularly to the military establishment. Before he unilaterally ended the recent round of fighting in July 2008, clashes had spread to an eastern suburb of the capital near the airport, and there were rumoured reports of an abortive coup and shakeups within the Yemeni military.

The South

For years, Southern Yemenis have been disaffected by their perceived second-class status in a unified state from which many of their leaders tried to secede during the civil war in 1994. Unemployment in the areas which comprised the former socialist state of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) far outweighs that of the rest of the country and many southerners have felt cut off from government services and jobs. The southern movement evolved from protests in 2007 by thousands of retired soldiers and civil servants, complaining that their pensions had not been paid. The movement has since pulled in other dissatisfied elements of society including secessionist and socialist groups, and important political figures. There is widespread resentment in the south towards the north's mismanagement of the economy; alleged bias towards northerners in business contracts and the allocation of land in the south; widespread corruption, and inadequate implementation of the rule of law. Although the movement has professed to be peaceful, there were initially calls to arms and national troops have been ambushed. Sporadic grenade attacks and bomb blasts target military checkpoints throughout the south, leading to confusion over what is and what is not terrorist activity. The sometimes violent response of the security forces to peaceful demonstrations has exacerbated the situation.

As the southern secessionist movement has rumbled on, there have been numerous indications that tensions are nearing breaking point. In the last few months three opposition figures have been murdered and there have been increasing incidences of clashes between southerners and northern security forces. During May 2009, the government stepped up its campaign of suppression of non-government media by announcing the suspension of seven independent newspapers on the basis that they had been "harming national unity", stopping trucks carrying newspapers and burning their contents. Government forces then surrounded the premises of the Al Ayyam, newspaper, for a number of days before storming the offices, killing one employee and wounding three others. Furthermore, on 22 May 2009, a large rally in Aden held to mark the anniversary of the Union between North and South ended in violence when police opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators, killing three and injuring thirty others. The government clampdown on the press has already proved counterproductive and has arguably created greater dissent. Reports of mass stockpiling of weapons continue to surface which add to the recent unrest in the region and could also point towards the likelihood of a major confrontation.

Moreover, the animosity towards Sana'a in the South has created space for radical actors to flourish, as Jihadis have started to combine southern grievances with internationalist jihadi ideology in public statements and through sympathetic Imams. For example, in June 2008, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula made a statement that specifically referred to the regime's treatment of the South and accused the regime of being irredeemably unjust and corrupt. To add to this, in May 2009, the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasir al-Wahayshi, echoed these sentiments by announcing his support for "the people of Southern Yemen" in their struggle to secede from President Saleh's "unjust" regime. The willingness of militant jihadis to draw these types of links is an illustration of the potential for southern

discontent to spiral into an even more multifaceted, if somewhat disparate popular rebelliousness against the regime.

'It's the Economy stupid' - the destabilising effect of a dwindling economy

Although terrorism, provincial revolts, and unrest in the South are all serious concerns related to Yemeni stability, they pale in comparison to the long term structural resource and economic challenges facing a country with a rapidly growing population.

Yemen is heavily reliant on its small oil industry and although it is not as strategically important to global oil production as its larger northern neighbour Saudi Arabia, it does export to the Asian markets of China, India and Thailand, all of which are increasing demand. Yemen also sits on the Bab al Mandab strait, which links the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, and is used to transport an estimated 3 million barrels of oil per day (bpd). In recent years two important factors have come into play regarding its oil supplies. Firstly, most economists also predict that Yemen will deplete its modest oil reserves in fifteen years. Its two mature fields; Masila and Ma'rib, are approaching the end of their life cycle which has caused Yemen to look into alternatives to its heavy reliance on the natural resources for its GDP. Secondly, its crude oil production has declined from a peak of 460,000 bpd in 2002 to the current rate of 240,000 bpd. The loss of this oil revenue will prove to be a major challenge facing Yemen. Revenue from oil production accounts for nearly all of Yemen's exports and up to 75% of government revenue. Poor government policies are also exacerbating existing shortages as the government subsidising of diesel fuel costs the treasury about US\$4 billion annually (nearly 11% of GDP). The diesel subsidy has two negative affects to Yemen as it not only drains government revenues but also distorts commodity prices.

Yemen's government is relying on new finds, and hoping that offshore exploration will identify sizeable oil fields. However, the rising

number of piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden has the potential to inhibit offshore oil exploration.

Despite this economic doom and gloom relating to the oil industry, President Saleh is focused on diversifying into liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipping from its southern regions to South Korea. In May 2009, a US\$4 billion LNG facility at Balhaf, on the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula came online, with its first shipment scheduled to leave for South Korea at the end of August 2009, only eight weeks later. The industry expects to provide between US\$30 – 50 billion over its twenty-five year lifetime for the state coffers. Although modest by international standards, only producing 6.7 million tonnes of liquefied gas a year, it will account for 3% of global LNG exports, a figure which is expected to rise.

This income is sorely needed and will help in the country's attempts to reposition itself as an up-and-coming investment market. Yemen has experienced steady growth, almost 3% in 2008, and is pursuing integration into the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is expected to further ease trade relations. It is possible that high profit margins from LNG extraction will make future extraction viable in sites that were previously considered too expensive or technically challenging.

The expansion of the pipeline infrastructure in recent years has also increased the potential for commercial extraction where transportation costs were initially prohibitive. Yemen deep-sea ports are also extraordinarily well positioned, connecting the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean.

In August 2009, French major Total, Canada's Epsilon Energy, Australia's Adelphi Energy, Japan's Mitsui Exploration & Production Middle East and Norway's DNO remain the main players in the Yemen resource market. Total, for example, has dedicated much time and money towards the building of trust with local tribe leaders in the South to prevent interference and damage to its infrastructure relating to the LNG pipelines and currently

holds a 39% share of the pipeline whilst US Hunt Oil holds 17%. Three smaller South Korean investors form the remaining shares.

But all this development of the energy industry depends on the security situation across the country and whether a rise in violence continues to affect the exploration industries. Al Qaeda has seen how effective militant direct action in the Niger Delta has been in disrupting the operations and production of Western oil companies and governments perceived to support the US, and has explicitly called for the targeting of such sites and pipelines. The LNG plant at Balhaf will rely on a 320 kilometre pipeline from Safer, in the interior, which runs through these same tribal areas. Its tankers will also be vulnerable to attack from pirates in the Gulf of Aden. These factors combined may make an investment in the country too risky for many, but nevertheless opportunities do exist for those hungry for natural resource exploration and the Government are pushing for the plant to be part of a solution to its problems.

Conclusion

Yemen faces several complex and intertwined challenges at present which together pose the risk of causing the country to become a failed state. These include a growing economic crisis forced by declining oil reserves and the global recession, the strain on political stability posed by the impending transition of power, antipathy towards Saleh after cancelled elections and multiple internal threats to security.

Yemen's demise under the autocratic rule of Saleh continues to be predicted but has continually been rebuffed due to Saleh's iron grip. With the possible economic diversification from oil to LNG exports and the continued support of the US under the new Obama Administration, as well as its powerful gulf neighbours such as Saudi Arabia, it is possible that Yemen can recover and turn the tide. However, fifteen years after unification Yemen remains an incomplete state of

disparate tribes and religious affiliations most of which are now quite distinct from the Government control of Sana'a. Al Qaeda's resurgence in Yemen is yet to have been effectively counteracted and may now be at the strongest it has ever been thanks to the influx of jihadist from Iraq, Afghanistan Saudi Arabia and the Horn of Africa.

The growing trend in kidnap and terrorist activity in Yemen persists and, if it escalates any further, it has the potential to expand a lawless zone stretching from Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, to Saudi Arabia and the Littoral States. Implications for the security of shipping routes from piracy, organised crime and violent jihad would equally escalate affecting the transit of oil through the Suez Canal and the internal security of Yemen's neighbours. Internal dynamics relating to the tribal divisions and alliances against Sana'a must also be considered as destabilising factors to Yemen as the intermittent civil war in the North and the Southern secessionist movement are becoming increasingly linked with the resurgent jihadist groups.

Despite these factors, it is perhaps most pertinent to note that the major cause for any future instability will be linked to the country's economic prosperity and its reliance on natural resources wealth. The state budget is heavily dependent on revenue from dwindling oil supplies and without membership of both the GCC, (for economic and security guarantees), or the oil cartel OPEC, (to set the conditions for the global oil price), Yemen may struggle to paper over the emerging cracks.

If further resource exploration is able to reveal substantial new reserves, and the LNG project is a success, Yemen may be able to leverage loans and a support package to underpin the annual budget until those new fields become operational. Yemen's neighbours and international institutions may also deem that it is cheaper to subsidise a fragile state than reconstitute a failed one. In the meantime, uncertainty over Yemen's future prevents sustained, integrated

investment on a scale that would salvage the economy.

PREVIEW OF INKERMAN MONITOR SEPTEMBER 2009

As the security situation in the North Caucasus continues to deteriorate due to the authorities' incapacity to establish viable forms of governance and markedly increased activity of Islamic militant groups, questions with regard to the region's potential threat to European Security are becoming increasingly pertinent. The September 2009 Inkerman Monitor will examine the implications of these developments for the region and the international community at large.

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